Shelton appealed his conviction and sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 1 That court initially held that an indigent defendant who receives a suspended prison sentence has a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel and remanded for a determination whether Shelton had “made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right.”
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May 20, 2002 · ALABAMA, PETITIONER v. LeREED SHELTON ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA [May 20, 2002] Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the Sixth Amendment right of an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, fine, or both, to the assistance of court-appointed …
an attorney, he or she is entitled to receive the attorney’s services before being questioned). Section (b) permits the court to appoint advisory or standby counsel. Although a criminal defendant has an absolute right to defend pro se under Art. I, § 6, Alabama Constitution of 1901, Luckie v. State, 55 Ala.App. 642, 318 So.2d
Feb 19, 2002 · Shelton appealed his conviction and sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. 1 That court initially held that an indigent defendant who receives a suspended prison sentence has a constitutional right to state-appointed counsel and remanded for a determination whether Shelton had "made a knowing, …
657. Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, argued the cause for petitioner.With him on the briefs were Sandra Jean Stewart and Stephanie N. Morman, Assistant Attorneys General.. Charles Fried, by invitation of the Court, 534 U. S. 987 (2001), argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in opposition to the judgment below. William H. Mills argued the cause and filed a brief …
Shelton appealed his conviction and sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. ... Because Shelton remained on probation, the court held that he had not been denied any Sixth Amendment right at trial.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), is a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the accused cannot be subjected to actual imprisonment unless provided with counsel. Wainwright made the right to counsel provided in the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. ...
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling that counsel (a lawyer) must be provided for the accused in order to impose a suspended prison sentence.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to refuse counsel and represent themselves in state criminal proceedings.
Gideon v. Wainwright, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on March 18, 1963, ruled (9–0) that states are required to provide legal counsel to indigent defendants charged with a felony.
Kevin Wiggins was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1988 murder. He appealed, claiming that his attorney's decision not to tell jurors about Wiggins' troubled childhood amounted to ineffective counsel because it resulted in a harsher sentence. ... Therefore, they said, it was not ineffective counsel.Mar 24, 2003
A suspended sentence is a sentence on conviction for a criminal offence, the serving of which the court orders to be deferred in order to allow the defendant to perform a period of probation.
Justice Black dissented, arguing that denial of counsel based on financial stability makes it so that those in poverty have an increased chance of conviction, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. This decision was overruled in 1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright.
The Supreme Court held that Reynolds' identification of Coleman and Stephens did not stem from a prejudicial police lineup. The Court also held that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage, so the defendants were constitutionally entitled to counsel.
A Faretta motion is a petition that criminal defendants file with the court seeking permission to represent themselves, that is act as their own attorney, in a criminal proceeding. ... If the motion is granted, the defendant waives the right to counsel and represents himself or herself in a criminal proceeding.
Judges and lawyers typically refer to defendants who represent themselves with the terms "pro se" (pronounced pro say) or "pro per." Both come from Latin and essentially mean "for one's own person."
The term “pro per” is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase “in propria persona,” meaning “in their own person,” and it refers to a situation where a litigant represents themselves, without a lawyer. Pro per is synonymous with the more commonly used term pro se.
After representing himself at a bench trial in the District Court of Etowah County, Alabama, Shelton was convicted of third-degree assault, a class A misdemeanor carrying a maximum punishment of one year imprisonment and a $2000 fine, Ala. Code §§13A-6-22, 13A-5-7 (a) (1), 13A-5-12 (a) (1) (1994). He invoked his right to a new trial before a jury in Circuit Court, Ala. Code §12-12-71 (1995), where he again appeared without a lawyer and was again convicted. The court repeatedly warned Shelton about the problems self-representation entailed, see App. 9, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344-345 (1963), we held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to state-appointed counsel, firmly established in federal-court proceedings in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), applies to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment. We clarified the scope of that right in Argersinger, holding that an indigent defendant must be offered counsel in any misdemeanor case "that actually leads to imprisonment." 407 U. S., at 33. Seven Terms later, Scott confirmed Argersinger 's "delimit [ation]," 440 U. S., at 373. Although the governing statute in Scott authorized a jail sentence of up to one year, see id., at 368, we held that the defendant had no right to state-appointed counsel because the sole sentence actually imposed on him was a $50 fine, id., at 373. "Even were the matter res nova ," we stated, "the central premise of Argersinger --that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment--is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel" in nonfelony cases. Ibid.
Satisfied that Shelton is entitled to appointed counsel at the critical stage when his guilt or innocence of the charged crime is decided and his vulnerability to imprisonment is determined, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama.
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama, Shelton argues that an indigent defendant may not receive a suspended sentence unless he is offered or waives the assistance of state-appointed counsel. Brief for Respondent 5-27. 3 Alabama now concedes that the Sixth Amendment bars activation of a suspended sentence for an uncounseled conviction, but maintains that the Constitution does not prohibit imposition of such a sentence as a method of effectuating probationary punishment. Reply Brief 4-13. To assure full airing of the question presented, we invited an amicus curiae (" amicus ") to argue in support of a third position, one Alabama has abandoned: Failure to appoint counsel to an indigent defendant "does not bar the imposition of a suspended or probationary sentence upon conviction of a misdemeanor, even though the defendant might be incarcerated in the event probation is revoked." 534 U. S. 987 (2001). 4
The Court says that the Alabama Supreme Court has already resolved this question, since, in finding that respondent's sentence violated the Sixth Amendment, it "expressed not the slightest hint that revocation-stage procedures . . . would affect the constitutional calculus." Ante, at 13, n. 6. Indeed it did not, and that was precisely its error. It did not answer (because it did not consider) the question whether procedures attending the probation revocation proceeding could cure the absence of counsel at trial.
If you've been charged with a criminal offense and lack the resources to hire legal representation, you may be entitled to a court-appointed attorney. The right to an attorney in criminal proceedings is enshrined within the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, not until the 1963 Supreme Court case of Gideon v.
The justices in Gideon unanimously held that "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." The Court later clarified that this ruling applies where the defendant is charged with either a felony or a misdemeanor that could result in imprisonment from a conviction. This rule also extends to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
If you can't afford one, be sure to request a free court-appointed attorney. If you're facing criminal charges, contact a criminal defense attorney near you to obtain an experienced and informed evaluation of your case.
The Right to a Public Defender. The right to an attorney in criminal proceedings is clearly stated in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but the real-world application of this right is quite complicated. Even when a defendant’s right to representation by an attorney seems unquestionable, the issue remains of how to pay for legal services.
Courts may appoint an attorney to represent an indigent defendant at public expense. Some jurisdictions have established public defender offices, while others maintain a roster of criminal defense attorneys who will accept court appointments.
The right to an attorney, regardless of financial means, is one of the fundamental rights included in the Miranda warnings that police must read to people during or after their arrest.
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel. The right to an attorney has applied in federal prosecutions for most of the nation’s history, but it did not extend to all state-level felony cases, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, until the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The court later expanded ...
The person credited with the first proposed public defender’s office is Clara Shortridge Foltz, who was also the first female attorney on the West Coast. In 1893, she presented model legislation creating a county officer to “defend, without expense to them, all persons who are not financially able to employ counsel and who are charged with the commission of any contempt, misdemeanor, felony or other offense.” The California Legislature finally passed the bill in 1921, and it became known as the “Foltz Defender Bill” in at least 32 other states. Today, the federal government has a public defender program, as do many states and counties.
Thus, a defendant charged with a minor offense such as a traffic violation will probably not be appointed a public defender.
The Supreme Court first ruled on the issue of indigent defense in Powell v. Alabama, 28 7 U.S. 45 (1932), which held, in part, that the state denied the defendants’ due process rights by not providing access to counsel, despite the defendants’ inability to pay legal fees. Since the Gideon decision, the Supreme Court has held that state courts must appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases that carry the possibility of substantial jail or prison sentences. This applies even when the defendant’s specific circumstances carry no actual risk of confinement, such as when a defendant was facing, at worst, a suspended sentence of more than one year. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).