There is no such specific rule; 535 would be the only rule that would apply. However, recusal is based upon a claim that the judge has some involvement or interest in the case, or has a relationship with one of the parties or counsel, that makes it inappropriate for that judge to try the case.
Full Answer
The motion’s allegations must be sworn, which requires an affidavit or that the motion be verified. The judge must review an initial recusal or disqualification motion only for its legal sufficiency, and may not pass on the truth of the facts.
Our firm recently assisted a pro se litigant in successfully obtaining the recusal of a trial court judge in a civil case. The pro se litigant felt that the judge assigned to the case was biased against him after a hearing at which the judge refused to hear his evidence and threatened to throw him in jail.
If the trial judge denies the motion, appellate review is properly available by way of a petition for writ of prohibition. State v. Cam Voong Leng, 987 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). However, a trial judge’s grant of a recusal or disqualification motion leaves the non-moving party with little recourse.
The court held that Pennsylvania’s Chief Justice should have recused himself from a death penalty case in which he formerly served as prosecutor. Terrance Williams was convicted of first degree murder in Philadelphia and sentenced to death.
Generally, a judge must recuse himself if he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party to the lawsuit or has personal knowledge of the facts that are disputed in the proceeding.
According to the Pennsylvania Constitution, a judge can only be impeached for “misbehavior in office” by the state House of Representatives. Articles of impeachment are then presented to the state Senate, whose members decide on either conviction or acquittal.
Rule 2.11 - Disqualification (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal ...
Judges can recuse themselves sua sponte or do so—or decline to do so—if a party moves for disqualification. A declined disqualification motion is normally subject to appeal to a higher court, and courts have produced an extensive case law on the matter.
The only conditions that can be grounds for their removal are proven misbehavior and incapacity to act as judge. Article 124 of the Constitution states that by an order of the President a Supreme Court justice can be removed from his or her office.
A Judge of the Supreme Court cannot be removed from office except by an order of the President passed after an address in each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting, and presented to the President in ...
Common complaints of ethical misconduct include improper demeanour; failure to properly disqualify when the judge has a conflict of interest; engaging in ex parte communication and failure to execute their judicial duties in a timely fashion.
The Code of Conduct for United States JudgesThe Code of Conduct for United States Judges includes the ethical canons that apply to federal judges and provides guidance on their performance of official duties and engagement in a variety of outside activities.
The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. 3.
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge* of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding. (d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(3)Effect of Recusal. Upon determining herself or himself to be recused, the judge shall not further participate in the proceeding unless her or his recusal is waived by the parties as provided in subdivision (c) below.
Recusal is the act of a judge or prosecutor being removed or excusing one's self from a legal case due to conflict of interest or other good reason. Recusal is governed by federal laws and state laws and codes of ethics, which vary by state.
There are six mandatory recusal. grounds: (1) the judge is a party or shares "a duty, right or bears. liability" with a party; (2) the matter concerns the judge's spouse, even if the marriage no longer exists; (3) the matter concerns a. person with whom the judge is directly related or is related by.
advisory opinions in response to questions about ethics from individual judges.
Judges may not turn their eyes away from knowledge of their financial inter-. ests, however, since § 455(c), like its counterparts in Canon 3C(l)(c) and Penn-. sylvania Code ofJudicial Conduct Canon 3C(2), states that judges should inform.
“Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'”.
Terrance Williams was convicted of first degree murder in Philadelphia and sentenced to death. Ronald Castillo was the district attorney in Philadelphia during the trial and was subsequently elected to serve on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court [official website].
Baker [SCOTUSblog materials], Michael Rippo discovered that the judge hearing his criminal case was the subject of a federal bribery investigation, and Rippo believed the same district attorney’s office that was prosecuting him was playing a part in the judge’s bribery investigation. Rippo sought to disqualify the judge based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the judge declined to recuse himself. A later judge denied a motion for a new trial, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. The state courts again denied Rippo’s argument in later proceedings based on the failure to show evidence of actual bias. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that precedent dictates recusal at times where actual bias is absent. “Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'” Due to this, the previous judgment was vacated and Rippo’s case was remanded for further proceedings.
In Rippo v. Baker [SCOTUSblog materials], Michael Rippo discovered that the judge hearing his criminal case was the subject of a federal bribery investigation, and Rippo believed the same district attorney’s office that was prosecuting him was playing a part in the judge’s bribery investigation.
The pro se litigant felt that the judge assigned to the case was biased against him after a hearing at which the judge refused to hear his evidence and threatened to throw him in jail. Our firm assisted the pro se litigant in filing a motion to disqualify and recuse the judge. The judge granted the motion, and another judge was assigned to the case.
Our firm recently assisted a pro se litigant in successfully obtaining the recusal of a trial court judge in a civil case.
Without explanation, the chief justice denied Williams’s motion for recusal and the request for its referral.
The question presented is whether the justice’s denial of the recusal motion and his subsequent judicial participation violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to the majority, the Due Process Clause required Chief Justice Castille’s recusal because he had “significant, personal involvement in a critical trial decision” in Williams’s case. Ante, at 9. Otherwise, the majority explains, there is “an unacceptable risk of actual bias.” Ante, at 11. In the majority’s view, “ [t]his conclusion follows from the Court’s analysis in In re Murchison .” Ante, at 6. But Murchison does not support the majority’s new rule—far from it.
1. Chief Justice Castille’s denial of the recusal motion and his subsequent judicial participation violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 5–12.
Williams, 26 Tex. 583 (1863), the Supreme Court of Texas acknowledged that a judge was not, “by the common law, disqualified from sitting in a cause in which he had been of counsel” and concluded “that the fact that the presiding judge had been of counsel in the case did not necessarily render him interested in it.”.
Thirty-two years ago, Williams and his accomplice beat their victim to death with a tire iron and a socket wrench. Commonwealth v. Williams, 524 Pa. 218, 222–224, 570 A. 2d 75, 77–78 (1990) ( Williams I ). Williams later returned to the scene of the crime, a cemetery, soaked the victim’s body in gasoline, and set it on fire. Id., at 224, 570 A. 2d, at 78. After the trial against Williams commenced, both the Chief of the Homicide Unit and the District Attorney, Ronald Castille, approved the trial prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty by signing a piece of paper. See App. 426. That was Castille’s only involvement in Williams’ criminal case. Thereafter, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Williams of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to death. Williams I, 524 Pa., at 221–222, 570 A. 2d, at 77. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id., at 235, 570 A. 2d, at 84.
In the context of a criminal proceeding, the Due Process Clause requires States to adopt those practices that are fundamental to principles of liberty and justice, and which inhere “in the very idea of free government” and are “the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government.” Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 106 (1908). A fair trial and appeal is one such right. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 (1941); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U. S. 813, 825 (1986). In ensuring that right, “it is normally within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out,” unless a procedure “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Id., at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The judge denied that motion, concluding that the attorney had appeared before him previously with "no ill will, bias or prejudice," revealed that the settlement was satisfactory to him, and that the prior relationship would not affect his decision making ability in any case in which the attorney was involved. The judge also denied the motion in the prior case because he felt the attorney had been substituted in as a tactical move.
A difficult question often faced by litigants is whether a trial judge is deciding his or her case with a fair and unbiased eye. Should a litigant feel that they are not getting a fair shake, the party can file a motion for recusal of the trial judge. R. 1:12-2 of the New Jersey Rules of Court, however, requires that the motion be made to the actual trial judge whose recusal is sought.
The Appellate Division first detailed the history between the trial judge and Rekha’s attorney, noting, among other things, that the judge placed the attorney on his disqualification list once he was appointed to the bench. The judge subsequently filed a complaint for dissolution of the partnership, accusing the attorney of wrongdoing. The matter, however, ultimately settled. Six years later in 2004, the judge removed the attorney from the recusal list after Rekha’s attorney in another matter did not seek the judge’s recusal and had actually appeared before the judge several times.
Here, the Appellate Division noted that Rekha’s attorney was substituted as her attorney 2 months prior to trial and that, prior thereto, the judge criticized Rekha for failing to comply with discovery. Once the attorney commenced representation, two Case Management Conferences were held prior to her filing the recusal motion. The judge continued to find Rekha in violation of discovery Orders and ultimately issued an Order suppressing her pleadings and precluding her from producing evidence at trial, scheduled for 9 days after the Order’s issuance. It was only on the day before trial that the motion for recusal was filed on short notice. In denying the motion, the trial judge noted that he had already twice denied such motions in other matters with which the attorney was involved and that he was relying on his reasoning in relation to one of those prior denials. The judge also added that Rekha deliberately tried to delay trial both before and after she retained the attorney and that the attorney knew when he entered the case that a trial date was set.