Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) ILLINOIS v. WARDLOW No. 98-1036. Argued November 2, 1999-Decided January 12,2000 Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing a caravan of police vehicles converge on an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking.
The Illinois trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress, finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. App. 14. Following a stipulated bench trial, Wardlow was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.
Not everyone in the legal community agrees with this take. U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, now retired, wrote the dissent in Illinois v. Wardlow. He broke down the possible reasons people might run when encountering police officers.
The officers discovered a handgun on Wardlow and arrested him. Wardlow was ultimately convicted of a felony weapons offense. The Illinois trial court denied Wardlow’s motion to suppress the gun before trial, holding that the gun was recovered subsequent to a legitimate Terry stop.
The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Wardlow's conviction, concluding that the gun should have been suppressed because Officer Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry.
Unprovoked flight is the exact opposite of "going about one's business." While flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity, Terry recognized that officers can detain individuals to resolve ambiguities in their conduct, 392 U. S., at 30, and thus accepts the risk that officers may stop innocent ...
2000Illinois v. Wardlow / Date decided
Rule: There must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.
Primary tabs. A terry stop is another name for stop and frisk; the name was generated from the U.S Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio.
Overview. The exclusionary rule prevents the government from using most evidence gathered in violation of the United States Constitution. The decision in Mapp v. Ohio established that the exclusionary rule applies to evidence gained from an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
meat eaters. What is the term used to describe those police officers that accept payoffs when their everyday duties place them in a position to be solicited by the public? grass eaters. When police routinely use excessive force against suspects, it is considered: abuse of power.
Writs of Certiorari The primary means to petition the court for review is to ask it to grant a writ of certiorari. This is a request that the Supreme Court order a lower court to send up the record of the case for review.
United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), held in a 5–4 decision which crossed ideological lines that the use of a thermal imaging, or FLIR, device from a public vantage point to monitor the radiation of heat from a person's home was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus required a warrant.
In a 5–2 decision rendered on April 14, 2011, Florida's Supreme Court sided with Jardines, saying: "We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing a caravan of police vehicles converge on an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking. When Officers Nolan and Harvey caught up with him on the street, Nolan stopped him and conducted a protective patdown search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. Discovering a handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow. The Illinois trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. He was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the State Appellate Court found that Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. The State Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to "go on one's way," see Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491.
Discovering a handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow. The Illinois trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. He was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.
Two of the officers caught up with him, stopped him, and conducted a protective patdown search for weapons. Discovering a .38-caliber handgun , the officers arrested Wardlow. We hold that the officers' stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
When Officers Nolan and Harvey caught up with him on the street, Nolan stopped him and conducted a protective patdown search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. Discovering a handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow.
The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the argument that flight combined with the fact that it occurred in a high crime area supported a finding of reasonable suspicion because the "high crime area" factor was not sufficient standing alone to justify a Terry stop.
The officers were traveling together because they expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts and customers.
While "reasonable suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989).
Illinois v. Wardlow is not a Supreme Court case that most Americans know well enough to cite by name, but the ruling has made a serious impact on policing. It gave authorities in high-crime neighborhoods the green light to stop people for behaving suspiciously. The high court’s decision has not only been linked to a rising number ...
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled along similar lines, arguing that Wardlow’s stop violated the Fourth Amendment .
A 2015 report by the American Civil Liberties Union found that in the city of Chicago, where Wardlow was stopped for fleeing, police disproportionately stop and frisk young men of color.
Wardlow affects the public differently based on income level. “If the police are driving down a middle-class neighborhood, and the officer sees someone turn and run into their house, that’s not enough to follow them,” he said. “If he’s in a high-crime area though, there may be enough for reasonable suspicion.
According to the court, the arresting officer hadn’t misstepped by detaining Wardlow because officers must make commonsense judgments to decide if someone is behaving suspiciously. The court said that its interpretation of the law did not contradict other rulings giving people the right to ignore police officers and go about their business when approached by them. But Wardlow, the court said, had done the opposite of going about his business by running away. Not everyone in the legal community agrees with this take.
The year after Gray’s death, the Supreme Court decided 5-3 in Utah v. Strieff to let police use the evidence they’ve collected during unlawful stops in some circumstances . Justice Sonia Sotomayor expressed her dismay at the decision, arguing that the high court has already given the authorities ample opportunity to stop members of the public for little to no reason. She cited Wardlow and several other cases in her dissent .
After a brief chase, the officers cornered Wardlow and frisked him. During the search, they found a loaded .38-caliber hand gun. They then arrested Wardlow, who argued in court that the gun shouldn’t have been entered into evidence because the police lacked a reason to stop him.
Two of the officers caught up with him, stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. Discovering a .38-caliber handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow. We hold that the officers’ stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The police had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop because nervous, evasive behavior, like fleeing a high crime area upon noticing police officers, is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion to justify a stop
Respondent Wardlow fled upon seeing a caravan of police vehicles converge on an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking. When Officers Nolan and Harvey caught up with him on the street, Nolan stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his experience there were usually weapons in the vicinity of narcotics transactions. Discovering a handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow. The Illinois trial court denied his motion to suppress, finding the gun was recovered during a lawful stop and frisk. He was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. In reversing, the State Appellate Court found that Nolan did not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. The State Supreme Court affirmed, determining that sudden flight in a high crime area does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop because flight may simply be an exercise of the right to “go on one’s way,” see Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491.
In Terry, we held that an officer may , consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry, supra, at 30. While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989). The officer must be able to articulate more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” of criminal activity. Terry, supra, at 27. 2
Two of the officers caught up with him, stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. Discovering a .38-caliber handgun , the officers arrested Wardlow. We hold that the officers’ stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The officers were traveling together because they expected to find a crowd of people in the area, including lookouts and customers.
5 Nowhere in Illinois’ briefs does it specify what it means by “unprovoked.” At oral argument, Illinois explained that if officers precipitate a flight by threats of violence, that flight is “provoked.” But if police officers in a patrol car—with lights flashing and siren sounding—descend upon an individual for the sole purpose of seeing if he or she will run, the ensuing flight is “unprovoked.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 17–18, 20.
The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the argument that flight combined with the fact that it occurred in a high crime area supported a finding of reasonable suspicion because the “high crime area” factor was not sufficient standing alone to justify a Terry stop. Finding no independently suspicious circumstances to support an investigatory detention, the court held that the stop and subsequent arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. ___ (1999), and now reverse. 1
Respondent and amici also argue that there are innocent reasons for flight from police and that, therefore, flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact is undoubtedly true, but does not establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation. The officer observed two individuals pacing back and forth in front of a store, peering into the window and periodically conferring. Terry, 392 U. S., at 5–6. All of this conduct was by itself lawful, but it also suggested that the individuals were casing the store for a planned robbery. Terry recognized that the officers could detain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity. Id., at 30.
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DISCUSSION: Under Terry, a stop is justified if the officer has a “reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot….” In this case, Wardlow’s presence in a high crime area combined with his sudden flight upon seeing police officer was sufficient to meet the standard.
The Court held that “[w]hile “reasonable suspicion” is less demanding than probable cause, there must be at least a minimal level of objective justification for the stop.” This case also serves to define how “reasonable suspicion” relates to probable cause, specifically pointing out that it is lessthan a preponderance of evidence.
Concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part in the course of saying he agreed with the court’s rejection of a rule proposed by the state courts authorizing the detention of anyone who flees at the sight of a police car.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Nervous, evasive behavior and location in a high crime area are relevant factors in determining the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop under the Fourth Amendment.
Officers are not required to ignore relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether further investigation is warranted. Headlong flight is suggestive of wrongdoing.
In Terry, we held that an officer may , consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry, supra, at 30. While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). The officer must be able to articulate more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” of criminal activity. Terry, supra, at 27. 2
The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the argument that flight combined with the fact that it occurred in a high crime area supported a finding of reasonable suspicion because the “high crime area” factor was not sufficient standing alone to justify a Terry stop.
Nolan and Harvey were among eight officers in a four car caravan that was converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking , and the officers anticipated encountering a large number of people in the area, including drug customers and individuals serving as lookouts. App. 8. It was in this context that Officer Nolan decided to investigate Wardlow after observing him flee. An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). But officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a “high crime area” among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 and 147—148 (1972).
Two of the officers caught up with him, stopped him and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. Discovering a .38-caliber handgun , the officers arrested Wardlow. We hold that the officers’ stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Discovering a .38-caliber handgun, the officers arrested Wardlow. We hold that the officers’ stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On September 9, 1995, Officers Nolan and Harvey were working as uniformed officers in the special operations section of the Chicago Police Department.
While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Sam Wardlow, who was holding an opaque bag, inexplicably fled an area of Chicago known for heavy narcotics trafficking after noticing police officers in the area.
Is a person's sudden and unprovoked flight from identifiable police officers, patrolling a high crime area, sufficiently suspicious to justify the officers' stop of that person?