United States , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that if the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial right is violated, then the Court must dismiss the indictment against the defendant or reverse the conviction.
Invoking the Right to Counsel The burden is on the accused to invoke their right to counsel. The accused should, under Miranda, be told that they have the right to an attorney, but law enforcement officers don't need to ask whether they want one or any other clarifying questions.
United States , the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the Sixth Amendment is violated when a defendant, having been charged and awaiting trial, is interrogated by police officers without the presence of a defense attorney.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that all defendants facing imprisonment must have the right to an attorney, regardless of whether the charges are felony or misdemeanors, so long as there is a possibility of some jail time.Nov 23, 2021
The amendment that gives you the right to the assistance of counsel at all stages of a criminal investigation or prosecution is the Sixth (6th) Amendment. You can invoke your right to counsel by saying, “I want to speak to an attorney. I am not answering any other questions until after I speak to an attorney.”Jan 7, 2022
In order to invoke this right, you can say the same thing that you would say to invoke your right to silence: “I am invoking my right to remain silent and my right to an attorney, and I won't be answering any more questions without a lawyer.” Once you have made this clear, you should be given an opportunity to contact ...Nov 20, 2020
The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees that an accused shall have the assistance of counsel "for his defense,"' 6 but the Sixth Amendment has application only to criminal prosecutions in the federal courts, and not to state criminal actions.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the rights of criminal defendants, including the right to a public trial without unnecessary delay, the right to a lawyer, the right to an impartial jury, and the right to know who your accusers are and the nature of the charges and evidence against you.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, specifically the right of defendants in criminal cases to a speedy trial.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific. Thus, generally, if a person has been indicted for one offense and is represented by counsel, the police may not question the defendant about that offense, but may initiate questioning of the defendant with regard to another, uncharged offense.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be ...
Accordingly, when law enforcement officials question high-ranking corporate executives after the initiation of formal criminal proceedings, the Sixth Amendment dictates that -- absent a valid waiver of the right to counsel -- all statements made by corporate executives are inadmissible against the corporation at a ...
Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the rights of criminal defendants, including the right to a public trial without unnecessary delay, the right to a lawyer, the right to an impartial jury, and the right to know who your accusers are and the nature of the charges and evidence against you.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
First, they contend that new allegations in the Third Amended Complaint—specifically, that Plaintiffs had a right to enter a plea at the first appearance— distinguish the case in its present form from what this Court and the Ninth Circuit previously considered, and render the first appearance a critical stage requiring counsel. Opp‘n (dkt. 98) at 5−6. Next, they argue that the Ninth Circuit‘s instruction to consider whether counsel was appointed within a reasonable time after attachment, a mandate that Plaintiffs believe contemplates a facial challenge to the policy, requires examination of factual issues inappropriate for resolution at the pleading stage. Id. at 6−11. Plaintiffs also contend that they have adequately alleged facts supporting an as-applied challenged, because they allege that the delay in receiving counsel affected both Wade‘s and Farrow‘s ability to gather evidence. Id. at 11−12. As for Lipetzky‘s law of the case argument, Plaintiffs respond that the Ninth Circuit did not address whether the waiting period between appearances was a critical stage, and that this Court has not yet considered whether counsel was appointed within a reasonable time under the standard stated in the Ninth Circuit‘s decision. Id. at 13−15. Plaintiffs argue that the law of the case doctrine does not apply because the Ninth Circuit‘s decision constitutes intervening controlling authority, and because new allegations in the Third Amended Complaint require new analysis. Id. at 15.
Lipetzky contends in her reply brief that claims based on the Sixth Amendment are evaluated either under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires that a person claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show actual prejudice, or under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), which held that prejudice can be presumed for certain structural denials of counsel. Reply (dkt. 101) at 1–3. According to Lipetzky, Plaintiffs have not stated a Strickland claim because their Third Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that either Farrow or Wade was actually prejudiced by the delay in appointing counsel. Id. at 8–10. She also argues that analysis of a Cronic claim depends only on whether counsel was denied during a critical stage, and that nothing in the Ninth Circuit‘s decision or Plaintiffs‘ Third Amended Complaint should alter the Court‘s conclusion that neither the first appearance nor the waiting period between appearances was a critical stage. Id. at 4–8. Lipetzky contends that the ―only issue that the Ninth Circuit directed this Court to consider on the Cronic side of the ledger, which this Court did not previously consider, is whether the ‗sometimes longer‘ allegation potentially results in a delay of constitutional import.‖ Id. at 5. Because the parties have since stipulated that the Court may disregard that allegation, Lipetzky argues that the Court‘s prior holding should stand. Id.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court‘s dismissal of Plaintiffs‘ due process and equal protection claims. Farrow v. Lipetzky, 637 F. App‘x 986, 987−88 (9th Cir. 2016) (dkt. 81), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 82 (2016). As for Plaintiffs‘ Sixth Amendment claims, the panel affirmed this Court‘s conclusion that, on the facts alleged, Plaintiffs‘ first court appearance was not a critical stage that required the presence of counsel. Id. at 988. The panel held that this Court erred, however, in its analysis of whether counsel was appointed within a reasonable time after attachment of the right, and remanded for consideration of that issue under the correct legal standard:
Plaintiffs‘ original complaint included six claims: (1) violation of Plaintiffs‘ right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; (2) violation of Plaintiffs‘ right to a speedy trial under substantive due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) violation of Plaintiffs‘ right to a speedy trial under procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment;
Plaintiffs allege that Lipetzky implemented a written policy that ―arbitrarily withheld legal representation to indigent, in-custody criminal defendants for a period of 5 to 13 days after their initial Court appearance.‖ 3d Am. Compl. (―TAC,‖ dkt. 91) ¶ 1. Under that policy, a defendant would not receive counsel at his or her first court appearance, but if a defendant requested counsel at that appearance and could not afford to pay, the court would set bail, refer the defendant to the public defender, and continue the case for a ―further arraignment‖ several days later. See id. ¶¶ 1−2, 4, 21, 27, 36.
According to Lipetzky, the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in this case requires this Court to consider both whether the delay in appointing counsel created ―grave potential for prejudice,‖ and whether it resulted in actual prejudice. Mot. (dkt. 93) at 6. Lipetzky argues that Plaintiffs do not meet the standard to show the former, because the Supreme Court cases on which the Ninth Circuit relied for the ―potential for prejudice‖ standard involved denial of counsel at critical stages, and the Ninth Circuit‘s decision did not reverse this Court‘s holdings that neither the first appearance nor the waiting period between appearances was a critical stage. Id. at 6−8 (discussing Wade, 388 U.S. 218; Hamilton, 368 U.S. 52). Lipetzky contends that those prior holdings are therefore the law of the case, and that Plaintiffs have not given the Court a sufficient reason to depart from those holdings. Id. at 8−9. To the extent Plaintiffs‘ present complaint could be construed as bringing an as-applied, rather than facial, challenge to the policy at issue, Lipetzky argues that actual prejudice is required for such a challenge, and Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that they suffered actual prejudice as a result of the policy. Id. at 9−12.
As Lipetzky notes in her reply brief, courts recognize two types of ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment: claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which require a showing of prejudice, and claims under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), which involve circumstances ―‗circumstances so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified‘‖ and prejudice may be presumed. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124–25 (2008) (per curiam) (discussing both standards and quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) (discussing both standards). Whether Plaintiffs‘ claim here for failure to appoint counsel at the required time is in fact an ineffective assistance claim, or is subject to the same rules as such claims, is discussed separately below.