U.S. Supreme Court Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) Furman v. Georgia. No. 69-5003. Argued January 17, 1972. Decided June 29, 1972* 408 U.S. 238. Syllabus. Imposition and carrying out of death penalty in these cases held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In what 1972 case did the Court rule that an attorney must be provided in all criminal cases where the penalty includes imprisonment gideon v. wainwright A landmark case in United States Supreme Court history.
Argued: February 23, 1972 Decided: June 29, 1972. [ Footnote * ] Together with No. 70-94, In re Pappas, on certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, also argued February 23, 1972, and No. 70-57, United States v. Caldwell, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, argued February 22, 1972.
An attorney must be found who is prepared to spend precious hours - the basic commodity he has to sell - on a case that seldom fully compensates him and often brings him no fee at all. ... [408 U.S. 238, 308] Penalty Cases, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 1268, 1275-1292. See also dissenting opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, post, at 395; concurring opinion of ...
In 1972, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Supreme Court further extended the right to legal counsel to include any defendant charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment. Gideon v. Wainwright was part of the Supreme Court's innovative approach to criminal justice in the 1950s and 1960s.
Wainwright, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on March 18, 1963, ruled (9–0) that states are required to provide legal counsel to indigent defendants charged with a felony.Mar 11, 2022
The Supreme Court held that Mr. Frye was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and that Strickland v. Washington provides the appropriate standard for evaluating such a claim. Consequently, a prisoner pursuing such a claim must prove both deficient performance and prejudice.Mar 1, 2012
In Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution requires the states to provide defense attorneys to criminal defendants charged with serious offenses who cannot afford lawyers themselves.
Held: The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial, and petitioner's trial and conviction without the assistance of counsel violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wainwright (1963) - Government must pay for a lawyer for defendants who cannot afford one themselves. - 14th Amendment says that states shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
1963Right To Counsel For Indigent Extended To States In Gideon v. Wainwright , the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously extends to state court trials the rule it established for federal court trials nearly 30 years earlier in Johnson v.
The case that established that defendants have a right to represent themselves was Faretta v. California, U.S. Sup. Ct. 1975. The Faretta case said that a judge must allow self-representation if a defendant is competent to understand and participate in the court proceedings.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires U.S. states to provide attorneys to criminal defendants who are unable to afford their own.
On March 18, 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, unanimously holding that defendants facing serious criminal charges have a right to counsel at state expense if they cannot afford one.Oct 24, 2018
Gideon v. WainwrightThe Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright established the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, regardless of a defendant's ability to pay for an attorney.Oct 16, 2021
Constitutional Issue The issue considered by the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright was whether States are required, under the federal Constitution, to provide a person charged with a non-capital felony with the assistance of counsel if that person cannot afford to hire an attorney.
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 70-94, In re Pappas, on certiorari to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, also argued February 23, 1972, and No. 70-57, United States v. Caldwell, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, argued February 22, 1972.
The writ of certiorari in No. 70-85, Branzburg v. Hayes and Meigs, brings before us two judgments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, both involving petitioner Branzburg, a staff reporter for the Courier-Journal, a daily newspaper published in Louisville, Kentucky.
70-85, Branzburg v. Hayes and Meigs, brings before us two judgments of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, both involving petitioner Branzburg, a staff reporter for the Courier-Journal, a daily newspaper published in Louisville, Kentucky.
The grand jury serves two important functions: "to examine into the commission of crimes" and "to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 . And to perform these functions the grand jury must have available to it every man's relevant evidence. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 ; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 .
We turn, therefore, to the disposition of the cases before us. From what we have said, it necessarily follows that the decision in United States v. Caldwell, No. 70-57, must be reversed. If there is no First Amendment privilege to refuse to answer the relevant and material questions asked during a good-faith grand jury investigation, then it is a fortiori true that there is no privilege to refuse to appear before such a grand jury until the Government demonstrates some "compelling need" for a newsman's testimony. Other issues were urged upon us, but since they were not passed upon by the Court of Appeals, we decline to address them in the first instance.
The relevant provisions are the Fifth, [408 U.S. 238, 419] Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The first of these provides in part:
The second consideration dictating judicial self-restraint arises from a proper recognition of the respective roles of the legislative and judicial branches.
The thesis of petitioners' case derives from several opinions in which members of this Court [408 U.S. 238, 429] have recognized the dynamic nature of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. The final meaning of those words was not set in 1791. Rather, to use the words of Chief Justice Warren speaking for a plurality of the Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S., at 100 -101:
Petitioners' principal argument goes far beyond the traditional process of case-by-case inclusion and exclusion. Instead the argument insists on an unprecedented constitutional rule of absolute prohibition of capital punishment for any crime, regardless of its depravity and impact on society.
Capital punishment has been used to penalize various forms of conduct by members of society since the beginnings of civilization. Its precise origins are difficult to perceive, but there is some evidence that its roots lie in violent retaliation by members of a tribe or group, or by the tribe or group itself, against persons committing hostile acts toward group members. 38 Thus, infliction of death as a penalty for objectionable conduct appears to have its beginnings in private vengeance. 39
The Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishments derives from English law. In 1583, John Whitgift, Archbishop of Canterbury, turned the High Commission into a permanent ecclesiastical court, and the Commission began to use torture to extract confessions from persons suspected of various offenses. 5 Sir Robert Beale protested that cruel and barbarous torture violated Magna Carta, but his protests were made in vain. 6 [408 U.S. 238, 317]
This Court did not squarely face the task of interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments language for the first time until Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) , although the language received a cursory examination in several prior cases. See, e. g., Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475 (1867). In Wilkerson, the Court unanimously upheld a sentence of public execution by shooting imposed pursuant to a conviction for premeditated murder. In his opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Clifford wrote: