The State’s Attorney’s office may, at our discretion, agree to Court Supervision prior to your court date. As a general rule, Supervision will be agreed to if you have not received Supervision for any other citation in the 12 months prior to the date of the ticket for which Supervision is being sought and your Driver’s License Abstract demonstrates you otherwise qualify.
Lewis, 73 Ill.App.3d 361, 386 N.E.2d 910 (3d Dist. 1979) The Constitution gives the State's Attorney discretion to decide whether to prosecute an individual. However, that discretion is subject to constitutional limits, and cannot be exercised on the basis of race, religion, or First Amendment rights.
2016, we have a new amendments to the fee legislation. And with the 2016 amendments we continue providing some tweaks to the law regarding attorney’s fees in divorce and parentage cases. Note that separately I have an outline that addressing issues unique to parentage in Illinois family law cases.
Answer to: How much does a state attorney make in Illinois?
The states' attorney has the exclusive and statutory responsibility for prosecuting violations of the criminal law of the State of Illinois, as well as many other regulatory laws of the state and county including traffic regulation, juvenile court matters and mental health hearing.
Generally, statutes of limitation are 18 months for misdemeanors and three years for felonies. However, there are some exceptions [720 ILCS 5/3-5]. When the police are seeking felony charges, the prosecutor is usually contacted to review the charges.
Every county in the State of Illinois has a State's Attorney. They are responsible for enforcing the laws of the state by working with law enforcement agencies.Feb 28, 2019
The Attorney General of Illinois is the highest legal officer of the state of Illinois. Originally an appointed office, it is now an office filled by election through universal suffrage.
A prosecutor may drop a criminal charge if it is determined that the evidence against the accused isn't strong enough. Or, perhaps new evidence is found which undercuts the prosecution's case against the defendant.
In cases of criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or felony criminal sexual abuse where the victim is a minor, there is no statute of limitations.Jun 10, 2019
The Cook County State's Attorney functions as the state of Illinois's district attorney for Cook County, Illinois, and heads the second-largest prosecutor's office in the United States. The office has over 700 attorneys and 1,100 employees.
88 Cook County State's Attorney employees have shared their salaries on Glassdoor....Cook County State's Attorney in Chicago, IL Area Salaries.Job TitleLocationSalaryAttorney salaries - 6 salaries reportedChicago, IL Area$72,657/yr19 more rows
The DA is required to call you under the Victim Bill of Rights because this is a domestic violence case. They could get in trouble if they did not do so. They have to send you a victim impact statement, get your position on the case, find out...May 15, 2012
State executive salariesOffice and current officialSalaryAttorney General of Illinois Kwame Raoul$160,800/yearIllinois Secretary of State Jesse White$156,541Illinois Superintendent of Education Carmen AyalaIllinois Director of Natural Resources Colleen Callahan5 more rows
42List of attorneys general#NameTerm39Roland W. Burris1991–199540Jim Ryan1995–200341Lisa Madigan2003–201942Kwame Raoul2019–present39 more rows
There shall be elected, by the qualified electors of this state, one attorney general, who shall hold his office for the term of four years, and until his successor shall be commissioned and qualified. He shall perform such duties and receive such compensation as may be prescribed by law.
People v. Easley, 2014 IL 115581 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c) provides that when the State seeks to impose an enhanced sentence due to a prior conviction, the charge must state the intent to seek the enhanced sentence and set forth the prior conviction in order to give notice to the defense. However, the prior conviction and the State’s intention to seek an enhanced sentence are not elements of the offense, and may not be disclosed to the jury during trial unless otherwise permitted by the issues. An “enhanced” sentence is a sentence which is increased by a prior conviction from one class of offense to a higher classification. (725 ILCS 5/111-3(c)). The court found that notice under §111-3(c) is required only if the prior conviction that would enhance the sentence is not an element of the charged offense. In other words, notice under §111-3(c) is not required when the prior conviction is a required element of the offense. Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, which is a Class 3 felony for a first offense and a Class 2 felony for a second or subsequent violation. The court concluded that the fact of a prior felony conviction is an element of the offense, and that notice under §111-3(c) is therefore not required. In addition, because a second or subsequent violation is a Class 2 felony with no possibility of any other sentence, the Class 2 sentence is not “enhanced” under the meaning of §111-3(c). Instead, it is the only sentence authorized for the offense.
Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162 As part of a negotiated guilty plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated unlawful use of weapons and in exchange the State nol-prossed the eight remaining counts. Years later defendant filed a 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1401) seeking to vacate his conviction since it was void under Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116. The State conceded that Aguilar voided defendant’s conviction and filed a motion to reinstate some of the charges it had nol-prossed. The circuit court vacated defendant’s conviction and allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea, but denied the State’s motion to reinstate the charges.
People v. Jophlin, 2018 IL App (4th) 150802 Where the State files a more serious charge against defendant after reversal of a conviction, there is a presumption of vindictiveness. No such presumption exists, however, where the State files an additional, more serious charge prior to trial. In that case, to establish vindictiveness, defendant must show both a retaliatory motive on the part of the prosecution and that absent such motive, defendant would not have been prosecuted on the more serious charge.
Although a statute of limitations period may be tolled, the court found no authority for the State’s argument that it is tolled when a defendant successfully vacates his conviction after the period of limitations has expired on charges that were dismissed as part of a plea agreement. The court specifically rejected the State’s argument that the “prosecution” against defendant was still pending and had not expired because defendant’s case never had a final disposition on appeal. The court refused to read into the statute “exceptions, limitations, or conditions” that were not plainly spelled out.
Kyles, 2020 IL App (2d) 180087 Section 5-130(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction any minor who was at least 15 years old and charged with aggravated battery with a firearm where the minor personally discharged the firearm. The indictment here was directed against both defendant and another individual and alleged that “said defendants” discharged a firearm. And, another charge in the indictment was directed solely against defendant and alleged the he shot the victim. Taken as a whole, the indictment satisfied the personal discharge requirement for automatic transfer, and defendant was properly prosecuted in criminal court.
Easley, 2014 IL 115581, the Illinois Supreme Court held that notice under §111-3(c) is required only if the prior sentence that would enhance the sentence is not an element of the charged offense.
Burchell, 2018 IL App (5th) 170079 The trial court properly dismissed the State’s information charging a violation of 730 ILCS 150/3(a),SORA’s temporary absence notification requirement. The information alleged that defendant failed to notify law enforcement despite being absent from his residence for more than three days within a three-month time span. The Appellate Court disagreed with defendant’s argument that section 3(a) cannot be violated because it lacks a time frame for notification, and held that the legislature intended to require notification on or before the third day of absence. But the court agreed that the provision requires three consecutive, rather than aggregate, days of absence. Because the statute does not specify the type of conduct prohibited (three consecutive days of absence from one’s residence), the charging instrument must specifically allege the facts of the offense. Here, the information did not specify which days defendant was absent, and therefore did not adequately apprise defendant of the nature of the offense.
In every proceeding for the enforcement of an order or judgment when the court finds that the failure to comply with the order or judgment was without compelling cause or justification, the court shall order the party against whom the proceeding is brought to pay the costs and reasonable attorney's fees of the prevailing party.
3d 628, 1295 (2nd Dist., 2003) (the same case as the Illinois Supreme Court case addressing personal goodwill) ruled that the trial court did not err in refusing to award contribution toward attorney 's fees where the parties “were equally unreasonable, litigious, and quarrelsome throughout the divorce proceedings, resulting in an unnecessarily expensive divorce.” The appellate court also stated, “Furthermore, although Jodi's earning potential pales in comparison to Earl's, she has failed to show an inability to pay her own attorney fees. See McCoy, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 132 (ability to pay does not mean ability to pay without pain or sacrifice).” Moreover, the appellate court commented that the wife was awarded a disproportionate and substantial share of the marital estate (worth approximately $326,000). Schneider is the newest of a line of cases which states that the court did not make a contribution award in a case with litigation where both parties are to blame resulting in an expensive and litigious divorce where there is no showing of "inability to pay." See, e.g., IRMO Aleshire, 273 Ill.App.3d 81(3d Dist.1995) [In cross-petitions for enforcement the court may apportion attorney's fees in a manner that reflects the parties' relative culpability.] IRMO Mandei, 222 Ill.App.3d 933 (4th Dist. 1991). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering each party to pay own fees where the fees were generated largely from the result of the parties' unwillingness to compromise.
Macaluso — Case Contrary to Konchar Holding – In Post-Divorce Proceedings No Bar until 30 Days after Entry of Judgment: For a while, the law seemed clear that a fee petition, even in post-judgment proceedings, must be filed before the final judgment is entered. However, the Macaluso v. Macaluso, 334 Ill.App.3d 1043 (3rd Dist. 2002), GDR 02-55, decision, disagreed with Konchar (as discussed above in the Illinois Supreme Court Blum decision) and held that a petition for contribution fees in post-judgment proceedings need not be filed before final judgment is entered, and the a petition may be filed at any time before the trial court loses jurisdiction. Macaluso reasoned that the timing requirements of the contribution statute do not apply to post-divorce matters because §503(j)'s references to "the final hearing on all other issues between the parties,” is specific to the bifurcated hearing required in pre-decree proceedings. I believe the Macaluso decision may be the better reasoned decision. Nevertheless, we have a clear conflict among the districts due to the fact that the original leveling legislation was not drafted with post-divorce proceedings in mind.
“early” post-“Leveling” cases that related to attorney's fees because of a party’s “unreasonable” conduct. In IRMO Menken, 334 Ill.App.3d 531 (2nd Dist. 2002), at issue was the husband's failure to consent to the issuance of a QILDRO affecting his state retirement benefits (Rockford police benefits.) The trial court entered an order that the father would not be required to pay fees unless he refused to consent to the issuance of a QILDRO. Later, when the husband in fact refused to consent, the trial court entered an order for fees. The appellate court gratuitously commented (because the father did not appeal the issue) that, “we feel compelled to note that the trial court should not have conditioned the amount of attorney fees on whether respondent signed the consent form. The issues were unrelated...”
There are not many disgorgement cases. The issues addressed by the Illinois Supreme Court involved Separation of Powers, the Supreme Court Rules and the Dowling case. The question was essentially whether the Supreme Court Rules and Dowling trumped the disgorgement provisions when there is an “advance payment” retainer. The point is that with an advance payment fees earned are not "available funds" under the statute. The Supreme Court somewhat sidestepped this point. Also, construing the statute to make earned fees available for disgorgement, will discourage attorneys from getting involved in low-income, low-asset cases.